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SAILING ON TROUBLED WATERS-ANTIQUATED U.S. MARITIME
LIABILITY LIMITS FOR DEATH AND INJURIES OF SHIP PASSENGERS:
OPTIONS FOR REFORM
RIAZ ZAMAN*
On April 15, 1912, the British luxury liner Titanic sank in the North Atlantic
off Newfoundland, less than three hours after striking an iceberg. About 1,500
people died. Far from the glamour of films now associated with the tragedy, the
lives of family members of those who died were shattered, in part due to maritime
liability limits offering lean compensation at best. Under the U.S. Limitation of
Liability Act of 1851, Titanic's shipowner could limit liability to the value of the
ship, passenger tickets, and cargo.1 Many survivors and families of those who died
received no compensation at all.2 Four years after the tragic sinking, Titanic's
owner, White Star, agreed to pay about $430 per each life lost, an exceedingly
modest amount even in 1912.3
The reason for such a low amount was due to legal thinking at the time that
shielded shipowners from liability, except where the shipowner had .'privity' or
'knowledge' that the accident could occur.4  Even in 1912, this approach to
compensation was an outdated throwback to 1851, when shipowners were shielded
from liability in order to promote development of a strong maritime industry.
Oddly, more than 150 years later, shipowners' liability is still limited by equally
arcane laws codified at 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501-30512, Limitation of Shipowners'
Liability Act and Fire Statute-the descendent statute of the Limitation of Liability
Act of 1851.6 Under the modem version, total compensation for all claims of
personal injury or death arising out of one incident is limited to "$420 times the
tonnage of the vessel" where the owner had no "privity or knowledge" of
circumstances resulting in the accident.
Although increasingly high shipping standards have substantially reduced the
risk of fatal accidents, the limitation laws have not been updated to reflect current
* The author is an LL.M. candidate at the Georgetown University Law Center.
1. Cynthia Crossen, Titanic's Sinking Plunged Survivors into Poverty, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 2003,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 1044398577689669693-search.html.
2. See id.
3. Id. See also James E. Mercante, In the Wake of 'The TITANIC': An Unsinkable Law, N.Y. L.J.
(Apr. 12, 2012), http://www.rubinfiorella.com/pdf/TITANIC.pdf (providing a brief procedural history
of the court cases that followed the tragedy).
4. Mercante, supra note 3.
5. See id.
6. An Act to limit the Liability of Ship-Owners, and for other Purposes of Mar. 3, 1851, ch. 43, 9
Stat. 635 (current version at 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501-30512 (2006)).
7. Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30506 (2006).
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realities. This article explores the potential impact of outdated U.S. liability limits
and options to reform the law. The author considers the London Convention on
Limitation of Liability of Maritime Claims ('76 and '96) and the Athens
Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea,
2002 as alternatives to the current U.S. law, but ultimately concludes that liability
for death and personal injury claims is best left to private insurers without
statutorily defined limits. This article also considers forum non conveniens as a
method of reducing litigation by foreign plaintiffs in U.S. courts-in order to
address concerns that repeal of U.S. liability limits will result in even more suits in
U.S. courts filed by foreign plaintiffs.
The article concludes that compensation is best left to private insurance due to
the flaws of international regimes of liability and the capacity of maritime
insurance clubs to competently compensate claims. More importantly, the need for
limits that existed in prior centuries no longer exists. In effect, the limits of
liability serve as little more than a subsidy to foreign flagged vessels, since only
one major passenger vessel today is flagged as a U.S. passenger ship. This subsidy
could be at the expense of U.S. claimants and others who file lawsuits in U.S.
courts.
Critics of the 1984 Limitation of Shipowners' Liability Act (hereinafter
"Liability Act" or "LOLA," where 1984 is the most current revised version) point
to many reasons why the act should be repealed. First and foremost, policy
considerations that motivated the passage of the original act in 1851 as a means of
protecting an infant shipping industry no longer exist. Critics have also noted that
modem legal avenues exist that carefully protect both the corporate entity (i.e.
shipowners) and claimants-primarily through insurance policies.8 In this modem
context, the subsidy provided to shipowners has no justification, and unjustly
weighs against a claimant, inhibiting a claimant's ability to obtain just
compensation.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN LIMITATION OF LIABILITY ACT
The foundation of the current Limited Liability Act was created in the mid
19th century to ensure that the United States' shipping industry could compete
with its European counterparts. This limited liability has been reformed over the
years, usually in response to tragedies; however, the attempts to completely repeal
this limited liability have yet to be successful.
A. Shipowners'Limitation ofLiability Act of 1851
Passage of the Shipowners' Limitation of Liability Act of 1851 (hereinafter
"the 1851 Act" or "1851 LOLA") is related to the early development of the ocean
cargo industry of the 1840s. The California Gold Rush that started in 1850
provided an additional stimulant to an already growing shipping industry.
8. See Mark A. White, The 1851 Shipowners' Limitation of Liability Act: Should the Courts
Deliver the Final Blow?, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 821, 822-23 (2004). In addition, environmental statutes
pre-empt the Liability Act for damage related to certain cargo. Id. at 838-39.
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Congress' passage of the 1851 Act was also motivated in part by the Supreme
Courts' decision in New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchants Bank of
Boston.9 The Supreme Court held that a contract shielding the shipowner from
liability was invalid.'o The case arose out of an incident occurring on the night of
January 13, 1840, involving consignment of goods through a business owner, Mr.
Hernden." Mr. Hemden ran a business transporting consigned goods.12  He
neither owned nor operated ships, but would contract for carriage of one wooden
crate carrying goods under his custody aboard the steamship Lexington, travelling
between New York and Boston.' 3 Owners of the Lexington, N.J. Steam, negotiated
a contract with Mr. Hernden absolving N.J. Steam from liability for loss or damage
to Mr. Hemden's crate.14
On the night of January 13, 1840, the Lexington and its cargo caught fire in
the Long Island Sound. Merchants Bank had consigned cargo with Mr. Herndon
that was destroyed in the fire, and sued N.J. Steam for damages.' 5 The Supreme
Court determined that N.J. Steam's contract with Mr. Hemden did not shield it
from liability and awarded a sum of $22,224, a windfall at the time.16 The decision
would eventually motivate Congress to set statutory liability limits.
In 1848, the same year as the Supreme Court's decision in Merchant's Bank,
gold was discovered in California, stimulating commerce and transport. As a
result, California became a state in 1850, and transport by land and sea continued
to grow. United States transatlantic shipping also saw a boost, with shipping lines
travelling from New York to Liverpool. The U.S. Collins Line was in direct
competition with the British Cunard Line, but the British vessels had the advantage
of protection from liability.' 7
With the rallying cry of "Remember the Lexington," Senator Hannibal
Hamlin of Maine introduced the bill that became the 1851 Limitation Act.' The
key provision of the act limits liability as follows: "That the liability of the owner
or owners of any ship or vessel . . . shall in no case exceed the amount or value of
9. Walter W. Eyer, Note, Shipowners' Limitation of Liability-New Directions for an Old
Doctrine, 16 STAN. L. REV. 370, 372-73 (1964). In fact, the original statute directly references this case
in its text. 9 THE STATUTES AT LARGE AND TREATIES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 635 n.b
(George Minot ed., 1853).
10. N.J. Steam Navigation Co. v. Merch.'s Bank of Bos., 47 U.S. (1. How.) 344, 385 (1848).
11. Id. at 347.
12. Id. at 345-46.
13. Id. at 379.
14. Id. at 345.
15. Id. at 378-79.
16. Id. at 354, 385.
17. See White, supra note 8, at 828-3 1.
18. Donald C. Greenman, Limitation of Liability Unlimited, 32 J. MAR. L. & COM. 279, 280
(2001). See also CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 2d Sess. 713-20 (1851) (recording the Senate debate of this
law); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: DEMOCRATS AND WHIGS 1829-1861, at 125
n.13 (2005).
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the interest of such owner or owners respectively, in such ship or vessel, and her
freight then pending" unless a loss is occasioned with his privity or knowledge.19
Interpreting the statute, the concept of limitation was further defined in
Supreme Court cases from 1871: Norwich Co. v. Wright ("Norwich 1"),2o and
Place v. Norwich & New York Transport Co. ("Norwich Il").21 In Norwich I, the
Court determined that limitation is derived from the value of the vessel after the
22collision. Hence, where a ship sinks or is completely destroyed, injured
passengers receive no compensation at all. In Norwich II, the Court not only
confirmed that claimants would receive no compensation when a ship sinks, but
more importantly, that insurance proceeds paid to the shipowner are not part of the
compensation fund because insurance proceeds are not part of the shipowners'
"value of his interest in the vessel" as required under LOLA. 23 The result of the
Court's logic produced a strange paradox-where the most serious and damaging
accidents result in the lowest compensation fund.24
In holding that an owner is limited to the value of the vessel and cargo after
the accident the Supreme Court explained: "The great object of the law was to
encourage ship-building and to induce capitalists to invest money in this branch of
industry. Unless they can be induced to do so, the shipping interests of the country
must flag and decline." 25 This concept of protecting shipowners as described by
19. An Act to limit the Liability of Ship-Owners, and for other Purposes of Mar. 3, 1851, ch. 43, 9
Stat. 635 (current version at 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501-30512 (2006)).
20. Norwich Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S. 104 (1. Wall.) (1871) [hereinafter Norwich 1].
21. Place v. Norwich & N.Y. Transp. Co., 118 U.S. 468 (1886) [hereinafter Norwich l1].
22. Norwich I, supra note 20, at 119-25. In Norwich I, the Court referenced a variety of
intemational maritime sources to frame Congressional intent in passing Section 3 of 1851 Liability Act.
Id. at 116-120. The Liability Act is a compilation of clauses from English law and liability statutes of
Massachusetts and Maine, referencing international maritime law. Id. at 119. The Supreme Court
recognizes a divergence between English law and maritime sources on the issue of the point in time on
a ship's voyage that its value determines compensation. Id. at 120-22. Maritime sources determine that
a shipowner may surrender a ship and any remaining cargo after the accident to satisfy any liability. Id.
at 116-20. English law, by passage of acts that carve out an exception from the maritime rule, require a
shipowner to establish a compensation fund based on the value of freight and cargo prior to the
accident. Id. at 118-19. The Supreme Court determined that Section 3 of the Liability Act did not mirror
the language of English law providing an exception to the otherwise established maritime rule. Id. at
119-20. Moreover, Section 3 was derived from the laws of Massachusetts and Maine both of which
uphold the maritime rule. Id. at 119. Although the state statutes address the issue of damage to cargo
only, the language of the 1851 Liability Act extended also to personal injury. Id. at 120-22. As a result
of the Supreme Court's interpretation, a compensation fund of zero is entirely possible when a ship
sinks and cannot be recovered; that is, when the post-accident value of the ship is zero. Id. at 120-25.
23. Norwich II, supra note 21, at 536-41. In Norwich II, the Supreme Court held that insurance
proceeds recovered by the shipowner cannot be included in the vessel's value for the purpose of
allowing compensation. Id. at 536-37. Maritime insurance is indemnity insurance. Id. at 536. As such,
insurance proceeds paid to a shipowner are not an "interest in property" that determines compensation
under Section 3 of the 1851 Liability Act. Id. at 536-41. Significantly, maritime insurance today still
functions as indemnity insurance and, as a result, injured parties cannot collect against insurance
proceeds paid to a shipowner that has filed for bankruptcy. John D. Kimball, The Central Role ofP&I
Insurance in Maritime Law, 87 Tul. L. Rev. 1147, 1153 (2013).
24. Greenman, supra note 18, at 283.
25. Norwich I, supra note 20, at 121.
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the Supreme Court in 1871 continues to drive modem maritime limits. Indeed the
Maritime Law Association ("MLA")26 used the same arguments as recently as
2010 to justify its recommendations for continuing maritime limits. 27 The MLA is
a non-governmental organization that states as its purpose to promote uniformity
of U.S. maritime law.28 On the issue of liability, the MLA promotes policies that
have been advocated by shipowners for more than a century. Like shipowners, the
MLA stands steadfast against repeal of the limit. 29
B. Amendments to the 1851 Limitation ofLiability Act of 1936 and 1984
Following its tendency to reform maritime laws only in response to tragic
events, rather than proactive reform, Congress first amended the 1851 Liability Act
in 1936 in response to the burning of the passenger line, Morrow Castle, on
September 8, 1934, which caused 135 deaths off the shore of New Jersey.
Invoking the 1851 Liability Act, owners of the Morrow Castle were limited in their
liability to the meager sum of $20,000 for all claims for loss of cargo and death.30
As a result of public outrage, Congress amended the Act's provisions relating to
personal injury and death by requiring shipowners to establish a compensation
fund amounting to $60 per gross ton of the vessel.3 ' The law retained an
exemption from the limit in cases where the master, superintendent, or managing
agent had "privity or knowledge" of conditions leading to the accident.32
Congress amended the Limitation Act again in 1984 to raise the liability limit
to $420 per gross ton of the vessel,33 again where the incident occurs without
"privity or knowledge" of the owner. 34 The MLA points out that modem courts
26. The MLA was incorporated in 1993, but traces its inception back to 1899 as the U.S.
counterpart to the Belgian-based organization, Comit6 Maritime International, an international body
meeting for the first time in the 1880's with the purpose of compiling and codifying maritime law.
About the MLA, MAR. L. Ass'N U.S., http://www.mlaus.org (last visited Jan. 10, 2014). The U.S. MLA
today states its purpose in its Articles of Incorporation as, "to facilitate justice in its administration, to
promote uniformity in its enactment and interpretation." Id.
27. See MAR. LAw Ass'N OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE
LIMITATION OF LIABILITY ACT 7 (2010) [hereinafter MLA, REPORT], available at
http://www.mlaus.org/archives/library/2094.pdf (describing the MLA's position against repeal of
liability limits).
28. About the MLA, supra note 26.
29. MLA, REPORT, supra note 27, at 7.
30. Greenman, supra note 18, at 284.
31. See id. at 284-85.
32. Id. at 285.
33. Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30506 (2006) ("Minimum Liability. If the amount of
the vessel owner's liability determined under Section 30505 of this title is insufficient to pay all losses
in full, and the portion available to pay claims for personal injury or death is less than $420 times the
tonnage of the vessel, that portion shall be increased to $420 times the tonnage of the vessel. That
portion may be used only to pay claims for personal injury or death.").
34. Id. § 30505(b). This Section reads:
Claims subject to limitation. Unless otherwise excluded by law, claims, debts, and liabilities
subject to limitation under subsection (a) are those arising from any embezzlement, loss, or
destruction of any property, goods, or merchandise shipped or put on board the vessel, any
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generally do not apply the 1984 Limitation Act based on one or more of the
following findings that are deemed to constitute "privity or knowledge":
1. Failure to provide or insure adequate operations, equipment, or crew;
2. Failure to detect and/or correct defects;
3. Orders by owner to vessel that proved improper;
4. Improper operation of vessel by owner or knowledge of;
5. Personal contract;
6. Improper stowage or other operational act by sufficiently high person; and,
7. Failure of evidence to prove no privity and knowledge. 35
Although this list provides significant potential exemptions from arcane
liability limits, the MLA's position certainly does not render the issue moot. In his
study, Statistical Analysis of Limitation of Liability Cases, Donald Greenman
found that between 1993 and 1996, out of ten cases, courts applied the liability
limit to six. 36  However, in periods surveyed since 1953, courts did have a
tendency to break the limitation more than apply it.37 Overall, Greenman's data
shows that from 1953 to 1996, courts applied the limitation in sixty-three cases
while breaking the limit in 103 cases. 38 Congressional action is essential in order
to promote uniformity of law for the victims of maritime accidents. Today we
have a situation where courts may break the limits for some, while denying it for
others.39
More recently, in December 2011, a U.S. District Court in Wilmington, North
Carolina, limited liability to $100,000 for the deaths of two plaintiffs on a vessel
operated by defendant Marine Specialty Management. 40  The two plaintiffs,
Cynthia Woodcock and Lorrie Shoup, were killed during a parasailing accident.41
The court held that the vessel liability limits apply. Accordingly, the families were
awarded $100,000 plus interest and costs. 42 Over the past several years, courts are
loss, damage, or injury by collision, or any act, matter, or thing, loss, damage, or forfeiture,
done, occasioned, or incurred, without the privity or knowledge of the owner.
Id.
35. Greenman, supra note 18, at 287.
36. Donald C. Greenman, Statistical Analysis of Limitation of Liability Cases 1953-1996, in MAR.
LAW Ass'N OF THE U.S., DOCUMENT NO. 729 THE MLA REPORT 10527, 10530 tbl.I (Gordon W.
Paulsen et al. eds., 1997).
37. See id.
3 8. Id.
39. See Greenman, supra note 18, at 287-89.
40. See Jason Gonzales, Insurance Company Ordered to Pay in Parasailing Deaths, STAR NEWS
(Sept. 20, 2012, 1:31 PM), http://www.stamewsonline.com/article/20120920/ARTICLES/120929957.
In a related state-court action, the decedents' estates were awarded 9 million dollars. Id. The court had
not determined the effect of the federal Limitation of Liability Act. Id. In this case, plaintiffs are
fortunate that they had another remedy not subject to the limit. However, this commonly is not the case
for many maritime death claims.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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increasingly applying the limit to incidents involving owners of pleasure yachts,
motorboats, and jet skis.43
Greenman's data about the number of courts applying the limit between 1953
and 1996 raises an interesting issue: Does diminished application of the limit really
justify ignoring it? Should Congress and society not have a duty to ensure a legal
system that provides just compensation for losses and a uniform standard of
determining liability? Although Greenman's data demonstrates a general tendency
to deny the limitation more than to apply it, the cases to which the limit applies
represent real losses to individuals and families. These losses must be of concern
to Congress and to the American public. To aggravate matters, compensation,
even when the limitation may not apply, can be further reduced by court created
interpretations that limit the types of damages available to plaintiffs.44 Although
all of these issues have been presented to Congress from time to time, it remains a
mystery why Congress has so far failed to substantially reform or altogether repeal
limits on shipowner liability.
C. Proposed Legislation Before Congress to Repeal Liability Limits from
1966-2010
Congress considers reform of maritime liability limits only in response to a
disaster. This was the case in 1851 when the Lexington Steamboat disaster led to
the passage of the 1851 Liability Act, 45 and similarly in 1936 when the burning of
the Morrow Castle caused the deaths of 135 passengers and led to the 1936
amendments.46 In 1966, Congress considered totally repealing the liability limits
after the Yarmouth Castle sank en route to the Bahamas.47 Again in 1983 and
1985 Congress considered total repeal. 4 8 But the 1983-1985 amendments resulted
in raising the liability limit only to $420 per the vessel's tonnage. 49 Most recently,
Congress considered reform in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon failure, where
an explosion on the Deepwater Horizon oil-drilling platform resulted in the deaths
43. Dennis J. Stone, The Limitation of Liability Act: Time to Abandon Ship?, 32 J. MAR. L. &
COM. 317, 332 (2001).
44. See Dooley v. Korean Airlines Co., 524 U.S. 116, 124 (1998) (holding that survivors are
entitled to pecuniary losses, but not damages for loss of society or pre-death pain and suffering, when
an action was brought under the Death on the High Seas Act ("DOHSA")). Nonetheless, pecuniary
losses can be significant, as this would entitle survivors to lost income of decedent over their lifetime.
See FOWLER V. HARPER, FLEMING JAMES, JR. & OSCAR S. GRAY, 4 HARPER, JAMES AND GRAY ON
TORTS 756-58 (3d ed. 2007). Damages for pain and suffering can also be a significant portion of overall
recovery. Pain and suffering damages may be especially important where a decedent did not earn a high
wage. See id. at 763-65. Hence, exclusion of such damages can be a significant loss for survivors.
45. White, supra note 8, at 827.
46. Greenman, supra note 18, at 284-85.
47. S. 3251, 89th Cong. (1966); see also Allan I. Mendelsohn, The Public Interest and Private
International Maritime Law, 10 WM. & MARY L. REV. 783, 805-06 (1969) (discussing proposals to
revise the Limitation of Liability Act in response to the Yarmouth Castle incident).
48. H.R. 277, 99th Cong. § 5 (1985); H.R. 3156, 99th Cong. (1985); REP. WALTER BEAMAN
JONES SR., MARITIME SAFETY ACT OF 1983, H.R. REP. NO. 98-525, at 10-11 (1983).
49. H.R. REP. No. 99-767, at 22 (1986) (discussing the current law that legislates levels of
maritime liability).
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of eleven individuals and injury of 126 people.50 Under maritime law, an oil-rig is
considered a "vessel," allowing application of the Limitation Act.5 1 An overview
of this history provides some insight into Congress' failure to act as stemming
from effective and continuing MLA lobbying success.
1. Proposed Reform in Response to the Yarmouth Castle Incident of
1965
In 1966, the 90th Congress considered a bill that would repeal the limitation
entirely, in response to the sinking of the Yarmouth Castle on November 13,
1965.52 The Yarmouth Castle caught fire on a journey from Miami to Nassau,
Bahamas, while the source of the fire could not be determined, one possibility was
a mattress near an electrical connection.5 3 Due to inadequate fire protection and
safety measures, the fire spread, eventually sinking the vessel with eighty-eight
panicking passengers and two crew members going down with the vessel.54 Others
managed to escape via inflatable rafts (despite an undersupply of emergency
equipment) and varying levels of assistance from crewmembers, some heroic,
while other crewmembers attempted to save themselves in panic.s Following this
tragedy, Congress considered Administration sponsored bills that would repeal the
limit entirely and require both mandatory insurance and compliance with
intemational safety standards mandated under the Convention on Safety of Life at
Sea.56
Despite a strong endorsement of repeal from the Executive Branch, Congress
inexplicably deleted the section relating to repeal of the liability limits in its final
version of the law, while passing all the other sections.5 7 Committee reports do not
offer any explanation as to why Congress failed to repeal the limits in its final
enactment. Executive departments and agencies that endorsed the repeal included:
Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration, State Department, Treasury
Department, Coast Guard, and the Federal Maritime Commission.58 The Federal
Maritime Commission, an independent agency responsible for regulating U.S.
50. REP. JOHN CONYERS JR., CHAIRMAN, SECURING PROTECTIONS FOR THE INJURED FROM
LIMITATIONS ON LIABILITY ACT, H.R. REP. 111-521, at 4 (2010). The Deepwater Horizon failure
occurred on April 20, 2010, when an explosion on the Deepwater Horizon oil drilling platform
enflamed the platform, causing a massive oil spill. Id.
51. See 46 U.S.C. § 115 (2006); 33 U.S.C.A. § 2701(37) (West 2013) (showing that for the
purpose of maritime law, the platform is considered a "vessel," allowing application of liability limits).
52. S. 3251.
53. U.S. COAST GUARD, COMMANDANT'S ACTION ON THE MARINE BOARD OF INVESTIGATION
CONVENED TO INVESTIGATE THE FIRE ON BOARD THE PANAMANIAN SS YARMOUTH CASTLE ON 13
NOVEMBER 1965 AND SUBSEQUENT SINKING WITH Loss OF LIFE 2, 22 (1966), available at
htttp://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg545/docs/boards/yarmouthcastle.pdf
54. Id. at 1, 22-24.
55. Id. at 16-18.
56. S. 3251; H.R. 10327, 89th Cong. (1966); WARREN GRANT MAGNUSON, SAFETY OF LIFE AT
SEA, S. REP. No. 89-1483, at 4-6 (1966) (report of the Committee on Commerce about the bills at issue,
stating endorsement of agencies).
57. See generally S. 3251; H.R. 10327; S. REP. No. 89-1483.
58. S. REP. No. 89-1483, at 11.
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international maritime transport, worked closely with the other agencies and
departments in drafting the legislation, including the repeal.59 Indeed, speaking on
behalf of these agencies, Rear Admiral John Harllee, Chairman of the Federal
Maritime Commission, explained:
We take the position that limitation of liability should be
eliminated, unless insurance companies or passenger ship
representatives offer compelling proof that (1) a complete absence of
limitations on liability is not needed to provide proper safeguards to the
public, and (2) elimination of limitations on liability would not be
feasible from a cost or insurance placement viewpoint. Even if this
should be the case, we would strongly urge that liability limits be
substantially raised.60
Perhaps, having mandated amounts of insurance coverage and requiring
compliance with international safety standards in its legislation, Congress saw no
need also to repeal the limitation.
Georgetown University Law Center Professor Allan Mendelsohn, who
worked on the repeal proposal for the State Department, stated that industry
witnesses defeated the proposed repeal with arguments ancillary to the issue of the
insurance industry's capacity to insure against unlimited liability.61 Arguments
from industry witnesses in 1966 have now been appropriated by today's MLA,
keeping them alive as recently as 2010, when Congress considered amending
LOLA after the Deepwater Horizon spill. In 2010, the MLA doubted the insurance
industry's capability to handle claims beyond liability limit, making the limits
62
necessary. Industry argues that historically most countries have maritime
liability limits and that repeal of liability limits would place the United States at a
distinct disadvantage.6 3 These limits, however, are a historical anomaly, enacted at
a time when a shipowner did not exercise any degree of control over the operation
of its vessel. Instead, vessels were operated by a captain and crew beyond contact,
and at sea thousands of miles from the shipowner. In past times, limits may well
have had the equitable and economic justification of protecting maritime transport
vital to commerce. Today, shipowners, aided by modern technology, are
responsible for vessel operations, no matter how distant. Moreover, and perhaps
most important, all other modes of transport have no liability limits of any type in
the United States. Carriers by road, rail, and air that operate throughout the United
States do so without any liability limits.M Nor would unlimited liability be unduly
prejudicial against U.S. carriers simply because unlimited liability would apply to
all suits brought in U.S. courts regardless of a vessel's flag.6 5
59. Id. at 11-16.
60. Id. at 13-14 (emphasis added).
61. Mendelsohn, supra note 47, at 803-07.
62. MLA, REPORT, supra note 27, at 2-4.
63. Mendelsohn, supra note 47, at 803-04.
64. Id. at 803.
65. Id.
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Professor Mendelsohn also discusses other industry arguments during the
1966 Congressional hearings related to the Yarmouth Castle, that have now again
been adopted by the MLA.66 Industry has long argued that the marine insurance
industry is incapable of providing sufficient insurance coverage to cover unlimited
liability and that unlimited liability would thus become the financial ruin of the
maritime shipping industry.67 But the capacity of the insurance industry to handle
unlimited liability in road, rail, and air transport indicates that this argument is
simply not true. Industry experts also argue that the procedure of concursus is best
68preserved in limited liability systems. Through the procedure of concursus, a
shipowner can bring multiple claims from one incident into one court. However,
with a few minor procedural amendments, concursus can be equally preserved in a
system of unlimited liability. 6 Alternatively, the same multidistrict litigation
statute that allows all victims of air disasters to sue in one court could be equally
applicable to victims of a maritime disaster.7 0
2. Proposed Reforms in 1983 and 1985
Congress again considered repealing liability limits in its 98th Session in
1983 and in its 99th Session in 1985. In its 98th Session, Congress resolved to
raise the limit of liability to $420 per ton as an interim measure, despite expert
testimony detailing many flaws of this approach.' Professor Allan Mendelsohn,
testifying as an expert in maritime law, noted that the concept of maritime liability
limits is currently unnecessary and outdated:
We may have reached the point in this 20th century, in the development
of our domestic and international law, where limits of liability have
become outmoded. They do not exist in domestic bus transportation.
They do not exist in railroad transportation, and they do not even exist
in domestic air transportation.72
Even more poignant is Professor Mendelsohn's belief that raising the limit to
$420 per ton would be more harmful to injured passengers than the $60 per ton
limit at that time. Professor Mendelsohn stated two reasons. First, he explained
that courts view the $60 limit as having no real legal meaning and will readily
break it to prevent the injustice of its application. 74 Second, raising the amount to
66. Compare Mendelsohn, supra note 47, at 802-05, with MLA, REPORT, supra note 27, at 2-4.
67. Mendelsohn, supra note 47, at 804.
68. See id.
69. Id. at 804. Concursus could be available to plaintiffs through an amendment to Rule F of the
Federal Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims, especially when read in
conjunction with 28 U.S.C. § 1407, allowing consolidation of claims in multidistrict litigation. Id.
70. Id.
71. REP. WALTER BEAMAN JONES SR., MARITIME SAFETY ACT OF 1983, H.R. REP. No. 98-525, at
10-11 (1983).
72. Limitation of Shipowner's Liability Oversight: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Merch.
Marine of the H. Committee on Merch. Marine and Fisheries, 98th Cong. 100 (1983) (statement of
Professor Allan Mendelsohn, Adjunct Professor Georgetown Law School).
73. Id. at 109-10.
74. Id. at 110.
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$420 implies that Congress had considered the issue and passed the $420 per ton
limit intending that courts actually apply it.75  This could lead to inadequate
compensation.7 6
Professor Mendelsohn explained:
Were there another Yarmouth Castle disaster aboard a vessel like the
Constitution, for example, a $420 figure would yield a fund of about
$7,560,000. Divided among the survivors of 90 fatal victims, however,
each would receive only about $84,000; and this would leave nothing
for the injured, no matter how serious the injury. If more than 90 people
died-as was the case with the Morro Castle and the Titanic disasters-
the recoveries would be even more inadequate. I would not wish to be
responsible for adopting legislation that produces such wholly unfair
results, and I am sure each of you shares my sentiments fully.7 7
Despite Professor Mendelsohn's warning, Congress adopted the $420 per ton
limit justifying it as an interim measure to adjust for the cost of living increase
from the 1936 limit, when the limit was $60 per ton.78 The increase was supposed
to be interim or temporary-until Congress could pass a more comprehensive
reform.7 9 Twenty-eight years later, Congress has not yet passed that reform.
A year after it raised the limit, the same committee considered a bill in 1985
to modify the $420 liability limit by adopting the 1976 Convention on Limitation
of Liability for Maritime Claims, ('76 London Convention "LLMC") an
international agreement that aimed to consolidate and modernize prior
international maritime liability agreements.so In testimony before the committee,
then Assistant Secretary for the Department of Transportation and current
Georgetown University Law Center Professor Warren Dean brought to light
several deficiencies in the LLMC.si On the issue of repeal of the limits, Professor
Dean agrees that the matter is best left to private insurers without interference from
liability limits set by the government. 82 Professor Dean explained that any limit is
inadequate because inflation can render the limit an outdated anachronism within a
short time frame from its passage:
75. Id.
76. See id.
77. Id.
78. REP. WALTER BEAMAN JONEs SR., MARITIME SAFETY ACT OF 1983, H.R. REP. No. 98-525, at
10-11 (1983).
79. Id.
80. H.R. 277,99th Cong. (1985), andH.R. 3156,99th Cong. (1985).
81. Department of Transportation: Hearing on H.R. 277 and H.R. 3156 Before the Subcomm. on
Merch. Marine of the H. Comm. on Merch. Marine and Fisheries, 99th Cong. 4-7 (1985) (statement of
Warren L. Dean, Jr., then Assistant Gen. Counsel for International Law, Dep't of Transp.) [hereinafter
Dean's Statement].
82. Id. at 4 ("We believe that the Committee should examine the need for preserving the
application of limits for both personal and cargo claims to determine whether market forces could
resolve the problem of compensation through private contracts, thereby removing any need for
government intervention.").
2013 51
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
Finally an inherent weakness of the legislative approach to liability
limitation is its failure thus far to provide for adjustment of liability
limits to compensate for erosion by inflation. Indeed, there may be no
reliable indicator to which a liability limit could be indexed. That is
another reason these matters are best left to the insurance marketplace.
The current Limitation of Liability Act became obsolete due to erosion
by inflation over the years. 83
The Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries did propose a set of
reforms to liability and workers' compensation affecting commercial fishing
vessels, while failing to reform liability limits for vessels carrying passengers.84
The committee offered no persuasive explanation as to why it failed to repeal the
liability limit. Its report merely states:
There was general agreement among the witnesses that the laws
regarding liability for loss of life or bodily injury are out of date and
should be amended to reflect present conditions. There was also a
feeling that all types of vessels, particularly commercial vessels, should
be treated the same. Some stated that a wait-and-see policy should be
adopted. They felt that the recent change from a $60- to a $420-per-
gross-ton limitation of liability, as required by 46 App. U.S.C. 183(b),
might be adequate without further legislation. Many others said that
legislation should be enacted that closely parallels the present
Convention of Liability for Maritime Claims, 1976. They felt that this
would provide the most effective and equitable means of protecting the
rights of victims and vessel owners.85
3. Proposed Reform After the Deepwater Horizon Spill in 2010
More recently, H.R. 5503 was introduced by Congressman John Conyers on
July 13, 2010.86 Amongst other changes, the bill sought to repeal the Limitation of
Liability Act." This proposal was a direct result of a petition filed by Transocean,
owner of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig, to limit its liability for injuries and deaths
to those aboard the rig, using the Limitation of Liability Act. The act would limit
83. Id. at 9.
84. H.R. 5013, 99th Cong. (1986).
85. H.R. REP. No. 99-767, at 22 (1986).
86. Securing Protections for the Injured from Limitations on Liability Act, H.R. 5503, 111th
Cong. (2010).
87. Id. § 4. The bill also proposes changes to DOHSA, which originally created a cause of action
for wrongful death under the Act, but limited remedies to pecuniary damages. Id. § 2. The amendment
would allow for non-pecuniary damages (e.g. pain and suffering, loss of care, comfort and
companionship, etc.). Id. § 2(2). However, under DOHSA liability limits contained in the Limit of
Liability Act apply. 46 U.S.C. § 30502 (2006). Congressmen Conyers also sought to amend the Jones
Act, an act that provides a right of action for seamen against their employer for wrongful death and
personal injury. H.R. 5503, Illth Cong. § 3 (2010). The amendment would have allowed for non-
pecuniary damages for wrongful death claims brought under the act. Id.
88. REP. JOHN CONYERS JR., CHAIRMAN, SECURING PROTECTIONS FOR THE INJURED FROM
LIMITATIONS ON LIABILITY ACT, H.R. REP. 111-521, at 4 (2010).
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Transocean's liability to $26,764,083, being the weight of the salvaged vessel and
its cargo multiplied by $420.8 The Deepwater Horizon failure occurred on April
20, 2010, when an explosion on the Deepwater Horizon oil-drilling platform
caused a massive oil spill. 90 The explosion resulted in the deaths of 11 workers
and several injuries to the 126 workers on the platform.91 In a committee memo,
Congressman Conyers states, "Section 4 repeals this antiquated law, which has
little relevance in our age of instant global communication and makes little sense at
a time when there are precious few U.S. flagged ships who could even benefit from
the liability limitations." 92 As of September 2012, the Pride ofAmerica is the only
major U.S. flagged cruise ship-a one-ship company93 operated by Norwegian
Cruise Lines. 94
The bill passed the House of Representatives on July 1, 2010.95 Its
companion bill in the Senate, S. 3600, died after being read twice in the Committee
of Commerce, Science, and Transportation.96 Senate reports provide no
explanation for not passing the bill. In the House of Representatives, a member
who was in the minority of the vote argued that the bill was rushed through in
response to the Deepwater Horizon spill without hearing expert testimony and
could result in unanticipated adverse effects.97 A member in the majority of the
89. Mark Long & Angel Gonzales, Transocean Seeks Limit on Liability, WALL ST. J., May 13,
2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704635204575241852606380696.html.
90. H.R. REP. 111-521, at 4.
91. Id.
92. Memorandum from John Conyers, Jr., Chairman of the H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary, on Full
Committee Markup of H.R. 5503, at 7 (June 22, 2010), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/pdf/Memol00623.pdf.
93. The "one-ship" company is a legal device that shipowners use to limit recovery amounts for
claims. See Malcolm Wallis, Recovery of Maritime Debts and the Role of the Associated Ship, 28
BANKING & FIN. L. REv. 103, 109-10 (2012) (discussing the increased registry of one-ship companies
and difficulties in collecting debts against them). A shipowner can register a ship as its own corporate
entity, with little or no assets to the corporate name other than the value of the vessel. See id. Recovery
of debts against these one-ship companies is then limited to the meager assets available in the corporate
name. Id. at 110-12. One-ship companies could render unlimited liability ineffective. See id. at 112-14.
The limited recovery imposed by one-ship companies can, however, be overcome by requiring vessels
to carry insurance coverage that could adequately cover claims. See Mendelsohn, supra note 47, at 802.
94. Pride of America Set for Major Upgrades, MARINE LOG (Sept. 7, 2012),
http://www.marinelog.com/index.php?option=com-k2&view-item&id=2899:pride-of-america-set-for-
major-upgrades&Itemid=230.
95. H.R. 5503, 111th Cong. (as passed by House, July 1, 2010).
96. S. 3600, 11Ith Cong. (2010). The bill was read twice in committee and no further action was
taken. Library of Congress, Bill Summary and Status, 111th Congress (2009-2010), S.3600, THOMAS,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dl 1ll:SN03600:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Sept. 28,
2013).
97. REP. JOHN CONYERS JR., CHAIRMAN, SECURING PROTECTIONS FOR THE INJURED FROM
LIMITATIONS ON LIABILITY ACT, H.R. REP. 111-521, at 31 (2010) ("Nonetheless, without the benefit of
even a single legislative hearing, H.R. 5503 virtually re-writes U.S. maritime law, making portions of it
out-of-step with the maritime-liability laws of nearly every other seagoing nation; eliminates important
provisions of the Class Action Fairness Act, a statute passed just 5 years ago, with strong bi-partisan
support, to ensure that class actions are decided in a neutral, fair forum-the Federal courts; and makes
significant amendments to provisions of the Bankruptcy Code for debtors with oil-spill liability. Given
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vote in the House of Representatives however, reported strong favor for repealing
the limit:
LOLA [Limitation of Liability Act] has clearly outlived any
legitimate purpose it may once have served. Its original purpose-to
promote American shipping interests-is now largely serving the
interests of carriers incorporated in Third World countries and using
foreign-flagged vessels in order to avoid having to pay U.S. taxes or
follow U.S. health and safety regulations. Moreover, Congress could
not possibly have envisioned in 1851 that movable industrial oil
exploration and development platforms would qualify as "vessels"
under LOLA and attempt to shield their liability in this type of disaster.
When LOLA was enacted, a shipowner could communicate with
the captain and crew of a vessel away from home port only through
documents transshipped on other vessels. LOLA was intended to
protect those owners in light of that difficulty in staying in
communication. Today's communication technology allows shipowners
to oversee their vessels as constantly as they wish, even when the vessel
is on the other side of the world. Owners today have direct
communication by radio, computers, and phone, and a ship can be
positioned and monitored constantly using satellite systems. Continued
use of LOLA simply removes healthy incentives for owners to properly
oversee their ships.
Finally, there are better, more sophisticated alternatives for
protecting shipowners than LOLA. Today, shipowners have a wide
variety of legal tools available that better protect their financial interests.
For example, insurance, contract, charter, mortgage, and the separate
incorporation of vessels are alternative methods that offer more
appropriate financial protection than LOLA.98
Despite excellent arguments put forth in the House of Representatives,
Congress once again failed to reach an agreement to repeal the limit in 2010 as it
failed after the Yarmouth Castle disaster in 1966.99 An increase in the limit to
$420 passed as an interim measure in 1984100 still exists as an anachronism in 2013
as the law of the land: a law that threatens and could well justify inadequate
compensation of victims or their survivors after a future maritime disaster.
the sweeping nature of the changes in this bill and the lack of committee process to create a record so
members could understand its full effects, we were unable to support this legislation.").
98. Id. at 11.
99. S. REP. No. 89-1483, at 8-9 (1966) (discussing the justifications for the limits that were
included).
100. REP. WALTER BEAMAN JONES SR., MARITIME SAFETY AcT OF 1983, H.R. REP. No. 98-525, at
10-11 (1983) (discussing Congress' decision to increase the limits instead of repealing them).
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II. INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS COMPARED TO THE U.S. LIMITATION OF
LIABILITY ACT
International law has developed standards for the liability of maritime vessels.
There are some aspects of these laws that are more favorable than the U.S. model,
but they would also not cure all of the deficiencies of the current system in the
United States.
A. Liability Limits in the LLMC and 2002 Athens Convention Compared to
U.S. LOLA
International maritime agreements present Congress with alternative systems
of compensation that could be adopted into U.S. law, thereby harmonizing U.S.
requirements with international standards. However, like the U.S. LOLA,
international systems also set liability limits that may not always offer adequate
compensation while adopting a stricter standard to break the liability limit than
required under U.S. LOLA. The MLA advocates for adoption of the Convention
on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims ('76 London Convention,
"LLMC").10 The International Maritime Organization ("IMO") drafted the
LLMC in 1976 to address liability limits for claims arising out of personal injury
and death.10 2 The LLMC mandates a higher limit than its predecessor, the '57
Brussels Convention,10 3 but provides shipowners with a limit that the MLA deems
101. MLA, REPORT, supra note 27, at 4. See also Convention on Limitation of Liability for
Maritime Claims, Nov. 19, 1976, 1456 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter LLMC].
102. See Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims (LLMC),
http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/Convention-on-Limitation-of-
Liability-for-Maritime-Claims-(LLMC).aspx (last visited Jan. 16, 2014) [hereinafter IMO, LLMC].
103. International Convention Relating to the Limitation of the Liability of Owners of Sea-Going
Ships arts. 1, 3, Oct. 10, 1957, [1982] A.T.S. 2 [hereinafter '57 Brussels Convention] (the convention
aimed to set international liability standards for death, injury, and damage to cargo). The convention
establishes a compensation fund based on a vessel's weight. Id. art. 2. An accident resulting in
passenger injuries (or deaths) and property damage will have a total compensation fund limited to 3,100
francs per ton of the vessel. Id. art. 3. The compensation fund is apportioned so that 2,100 francs per ton
is for claims arising out of injury or death with the remainder allocated to property claims. Id. art.
3(1)(c). Compare id art. 3, with Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30506 (2006) (each basing
limits on the tonnage of the ship in question). The international community would do away with this
approach in the LLMC and subsequent maritime liability conventions, instead establishing a liability
limit based on the number of passengers a vessel is certified to carry. See LLMC, supra note 101, art.
7(1). Another notable difference between the '57 Brussels Convention and the LLMC and its progeny is
the standard to break the liability limit. See LLMC, supra note 101, art. 4. Under the '57 Brussels
Convention, an owner would not be entitled to the limit where he could have reasonably foreseen
circumstances that caused the accident. See DUYGU DAMAR, WILFUL MISCONDUCT IN INTERNATIONAL
TRANSPORT LAW 162-166 (Hamburg Studies on Mar. Affairs Vol. 22, 2011) (providing an analysis of
the standards to break the limit in the '57 Brussels Convention and the LLMC). The LLMC has a higher
standard to break the limit. See id at 167-70. The limit should only be broken where the owner intended
the harm that occurred. See id. at 170-72. The approach taken in the LLMC is discussed further below
in this article. See infra Part II.B. See also Limitation of Shipowners' Liability-The Brussels
Convention of 1957, 68 YALE L.J. 1676 (1959) (discussing the standards contained in the '57 Brussels
convention, their development, and a comparison to U.S. law).
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almost unbreakable.'0 Of equal importance to the issue of liability limits is the
standard of negligence that defines when an owner or operator is entitled to the
limit and when it can be broken. 05 According to the MLA, adoption of the LLMC
in the United States would resolve potential inequities of the 1851/1984 U.S.
Limitation Act without subjecting the maritime industry to claims with no limits.106
Unlimited claims, according to the MLA, are uninsurable. 0 7
The Protocol of 2002 to the Athens Convention Relating to the Carriage of
Passengers and their Luggage by Sea ("the 2002 Athens Convention" or simply
"Athens") provides still another liability system that the United States could adopt
to replace LOLA.108 This convention establishes higher liability limits than both
the LLMC and LOLA.'0 9 The Athens Convention was originally adopted in 1974
to establish a homogenous liability system by consolidating the 1961 and 1967
Brussels Conventions.1 0 The international community considered the convention
a significant advancement. Prior to its adoption, liability was determined by
contracts of carriage that often excluded a carrier from any liability."' In 2002,
the original Athens Convention was amended to raise liability limits.112
The international conventions at issue require a shipowner to pay a set fund in
the amount of the liability limit. All claimants can then file for compensation from
the set fund, but the amount of actual recovery varies by the amount of
claimants." 3 These liability amounts are greater than the liability amount provided
in the U.S. LOLA. The LLMC, Athens, and U.S. LOLA provide for limitation of
liability to the shipowner for death or injury of passengers, as follows:
104. See IMO, LLMC, supra note 102.
105. Standards of negligence as defined in the conventions and breakability of the limit is discussed
in more detail below. See infra Part II.B.
106. MLA, REPORT, supra note 27, at 7.
107. Id. at 3-4.
108. The Athens Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea,
2002, entry into force Apr. 23, 2014, 2008 O.J. C74-E/567 [hereinafter Athens Convention]. This treaty
incorporates the updated language that was approved in a 2002 Protocol with the original 1974 treaty.
Compare Athens Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea, Dec. 13,
1974, 1463 U.NT.S. 19, with Protocol of 2002 to the Athens Convention Relating to the Carriage of
Passengers and their Luggage by Sea, Nov. 1, 2002, [hereinafter Protocol to the Athens Convention]
available at
https://www.gov.uk/govemment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment data/file/261628/Misc.6.2013_Pro
t_2002_Athens_8760.pdf (which updates the levels of liability utilizing the International Monetary
Fund's Special Drawing Right).
109. See Athens Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea
(PAL), INT'L MAR. ORG., http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/Athens-
Convention-relating-to-the-Carriage-of-Passengers-and-their-Luggage-by-Sea-(PAL).aspx [hereinafter
IMO, Athens Convention].
110. NORMAN A. MARTINEZ GUTIRREZ, LIMITATION OF LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL MARITIME
CONVENTIONS 116-17 (2011).
111. Id.
112. IMO, Athens Convention, supra note 109.
113. LLMC, supra note 101, arts. 9, 11; Athens Convention, supra note 108, art. 12.
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Athens: 400,000 SDR (about USD $614,290) multiplied by the number of
passengers the ship is authorized to carry in the ship's certificate;114
LLMC: 175,000 SDR (about USD $268,752) multiplied by the number of
passengers the ship is authorized to carry in the ship's certificate;" 5 and,
US. LOLA: USD $420 multiplied by the tonnage of the vessel." 6
Although Athens and the LLMC establish higher liability limits then LOLA,
the amount paid to each individual (or to the estate of a decedent) varies based on
the number of passengers filing a claim against a set compensation fund, in the
amount of the liability limit."17 In effect, these conventions value life based on the
number of passengers on board a vessel at the time of an accident."18 In contrast,
the U.S. system of tort liability values life based on a complex set of factors related
to conditions during the life of a decedent or injured individual. Compensation can
be based on loss of economic support to a decedent's family, loss of services, loss
of companionship, and pain and suffering, among other factors. Despite the novel
approach to compensation international conventions pose, in some cases
compensation may be adequate. But international systems cannot guarantee that
compensation will always be adequate.
114. Article 7(1) of the 2002 Athens Convention provides a maximum limit of liability fund of
"400,000 units of account per passenger on each distinct occasion." Athens Convention, supra note
108, art. 7(1). Article 9 dictates that conversions are based on International Monetary Fund's Special
Drawing Rights; when converted, this equals USD $614,290 times the number of passengers the ship is
authorized to carry. Id. art. 9; see also Currency Units per SDR for January 2012, INT'L MONETARY
FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/data/rms mth.aspx?SelectDate=2012-01-
31&reportType=CVSDR (last visited January 20, 2014) [hereinafter IMF, Currency Units] (based on
conversion rates in effect on Jan. 13, 2012, for conversion from SDR to U.S. dollars, and are used for
the following conversions).
115. Protocol of 1996 to Amend the Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims art.
4, May 2, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1433 (1996) [hereinafter Protocol to LLMC]. Article 4 of the 1996 Protocol
specifies the limit:
In respect of claims arising on any distinct occasion for loss of life or personal injury to
passengers of a ship, the limit of liability of the shipowner thereof shall be an amount of
175,000 Units of Account multiplied by the number of passengers which the ship is
authorized to carry according to the ship's certificate.
Id. (replacing the language of article 7, paragraph I of the original). LLMC establishes a fund based on
weight of the vessels for claims other than passenger claims. LLMC, supra note 101, arts. 6, 11 (these
are updated in article 3 of the Protocol to LLMC). See also IMO, LLMC, supra note 102 (explaining
that the LLMC also uses the International Monetary Fund's Special Drawing Rights).
116. Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30506 (2006).
117. See LLMC, supra note 101, arts. 9, 11; Athens Convention, supra note 108, art. 12.
118. See Athens Convention, supra note 108, art. 7(1); Protocol to the LLMC, supra note 115, art.
4 (updating the language of article 7 of the 1976 LLMC).
2013 57
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
Take for example, a "Voyager" class vessel of the Royal Caribbean Cruise
Line, certified for 3,114 passengers, weighing about 138,000 tons."' 9 In a disaster
resulting in the deaths of half the passengers, 1,557 people, maximum liability
under Athens, LLMC, and U.S. LOLA would be as follows:
Athens: USD $1,228,580 per person;120
LLMC: USD $537,504 per person;121 and,
U.S. LOLA: USD $37,225 per person.122
Courts may be also required to reduce these figures in order to provide
compensation to those who survived but filed claims for injuries.123 These
amounts would also be less if more passengers die or are injured in the accident.124
In some situations, limits set in Athens and LLMC may be comparable to damages
for loss of life under U.S. tort law, but this may not always be the case.
In aviation law, the international community recognized the very real
potential for injustice with any liability limits. With passage of the 1999 Montreal
Convention, aviation now has unlimited liability. 12 The 1999 Montreal
Convention unified and replaced various systems of liability for air carriers
provided in the 1929 Warsaw Convention and related agreements.1 26 The Warsaw
Convention liability system set a maximum recovery for personal injury and death
at 125,000 gold francs (approximately US $8,300 at the time).127  The 1999
Montreal Convention entered into force on November 4, 2003, with 97 parties,
including the United States, thereby becoming the law of the land in the United
States.128 The 1999 Montreal Convention demonstrates that unlimited liability is
very clearly a viable and desirable option. Unlimited liability in the air context
allows for compensation based on usual tort approaches instead of the approach
119. Royal Caribbean Voyager of the Seas, RCC RESERVATIONS,
http://www.rccreservations.com/royal-caribbean-ships/voyager-of-the-seas (last visited Jan. 20, 2014).
120. See Athens Convention, supra note 108, art. 7. Using the liability limit prescribed in Article 7
of the Athens Convention: (USD $ 614,290 x 3,114 certified passengers) / 1,557 actual passengers =
S 1,228,580 per person.
121. See Protocol to LLMC, supra note 115, art. 4. Using the liability limit prescribed in Article 4
of the Protocol to LLMC: (USD $ 268,752 x 3,114 certified passengers) / 1,557 actual passengers -
$537,504 per person.
122. See Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30506. Using the liability limit prescribed in
LOLA: (USD $420 x 138,000 tons) / 1557 actual passengers = $37,225 per person.
123. See LLMC, supra note 101, arts. 9, 11; Athens Convention, supra note 108, art. 12.
124. See LLMC, supra note 101, arts. 9, 11; Athens Convention, supra note 108, art. 12.
125. Montreal Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air art.
21, May 28, 1999, T.I.A.S. No. 13,038, 2242 U.N.T.S. 309 [hereinafter Montreal Convention].
126. Warsaw Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by
Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 4 U.S.T. 5250, 137 L.N.T.S. 11. See also Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Allan I.
Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARv. L. REV. 497 (1967) (discussing
the development of accident compensation in international air law and the United States' initial
rejection and eventual adherence to the Warsaw Convention).
127. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 126, at 499.
128. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air Done at
Montreal on 28 May 1999, INT'L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., http://legacy.icao.int/icao/en/leb/mtl99.pdf
(last visited Jan. 20, 2014) (containing a list of signatories to Montreal Convention).
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taken in maritime conventions, valuing life based on the number of passengers or
weight of a vessel. Like airlines, vessels subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts
should be subject to a similar liability system without limits. 129
Although adopting unlimited liability in the maritime context would be the
ideal solution, adopting the liability system in the Athens Convention is a viable
second alternative. Athens provides higher liability limits and contains an option
for unlimited liability. 130  However, as will be discussed further below, Athens
could impose a stricter standard to break liability limits-imposing its liability
limit in most cases-like the LLMC would.
Before getting to the standard to break the limit, it is worth taking a closer
look at liability limits under Athens. Article 3 of Athens establishes the burden of
proof for liability claims, by establishing a two-tiered system of liability.131 In the
first tier, the carrier may be held strictly liable up to 250,000 SDR (USD
$383,931), unless the carrier can prove that the incident was the result of an act of
war, natural phenomenon, or the act of a third party intending to cause damage.' 32
Regarding the second tier of liability, Article 3 provides that: "If and to the extent
that the loss exceeds the above limit, the carrier shall be further liable unless the
carrier proves that the incident which caused the loss occurred without the fault or
neglect of the carrier."13 3  This second tier of liability is subject to the overall
liability limit of 400,000 SDR (USD $614,290)134 times the number of passengers
the ship is certified to carry.' 
3 5
Article 3 (the second tier of liability) is the result of a compromise. Japan
proposed the same two-tiered liability system used in air transport, with unlimited
liability in the second tier.' 3 6 The Japanese delegation were also the authors of this
two-tiered system as it exists today for air transport liability in the 1999 Montreal
129. Montreal Convention, supra note 125. Article 21 stipulates the strict liability clause: "For
damages arising under paragraph I of Article 17 not exceeding 100,000 Special Drawing Rights for
each passenger, the carrier shall not be able to exclude or limit its liability." Id. art. 21(1). In cases of
damages above 100,000 SDR (USD $153,572), Article 21(2) provides no limit. Id. art. 21(2). However,
strict liability does not apply to this clause. A carrier may escape liability where it can prove: "(a) such
damage was not due to the negligence or other wrongful act or omission of the carrier or its servant or
agents; or (b) such damage was solely due to the negligence or other wrongful act or omission of a third
party." Id.
130. Athens Convention, supra note 108, art. 7.
131. Id. art. 3. See also MARTINEZ GUTIERREZ, supra note 110, at 130-33 (detailing the two-tiered
system of liability throughout the drafting process).
132. Athens Convention, supra note 108, art. 3(1). See also IMF, Currency Units, supra note 114.
133. Athens Convention, supra note 108, art. 3(1).
134. See IMF, Currency Units, supra note 114.
135. Protocol to the Athens Convention, supra note 108, art. 7(1). The revised article reads:
The liability of the carrier for the death of or personal injury to a passenger under Article 3
shall in no case exceed 400,000 units of account per passenger on each distinct occasion.
where, in accordance with the law of the court seized of the case, damages are awarded in
the form of periodical income payments, the equivalent capital value of those payments shall
not exceed the said limit.
Id.
13 6. MARTiNEZ GUTItRREZ, supra note 110, at 130-31.
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Convention, with unlimited liability in the second tier.'3 7 During negotiations for
Athens, Japan's second tier alternative ultimately resulted in a compromise to
create the two-tiered approach to liability under Article 3, but with a limit in the
second tier. But the original Japanese proposal with unlimited liability under the
second tier should have been adopted-as it was and remains today, in
international air law-in the 1999 Montreal Convention,13 8 adopted by the U.S. in
2003. 139
As an alternative to the limits imposed in Article 3, however, Athens provides
states with the option to set their own liability limits, provided the limit is not less
than those in Article 3 and Article 7(1).140 More importantly, the convention
allows states to declare no limit of liability. This "opt-out" clause is in Article
7(2).141 State actors must inform the Secretary General when choosing to use the
opt-out clause. 142 Adoption of the Athens Convention would thereby allow the
United States considerably more flexibility in determining whether any liability
limits should apply to U.S. citizens and parties subject to U.S. jurisdiction, while
still being part of an international regime.
B. The Almost Unbreakable Limit in the LLMC and Athens Convention
In addition to potentially inadequate limits, Athens and LLMC could establish
a higher standard to break the limit than the current approach in the United States.
The LLMC is appealing to shipowners because this limit is considered
unbreakable, except in cases of defined "willful misconduct" on the part of the
shipowner, 143 whereas the United States requires only an owner's "privity or
knowledge" to break the limit-a vaguely defined term allowing flexible
application.1" Under the Athens Convention, the standard to break the limit is
137. Id. at 130-33. See also Jennifer McKay, Note, The Refinement of the Warsaw System: Why the
1999 Montreal Convention Represents the Best Hope for Uniformity, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 73,
83-84 (2002).
138. MARTiNEZ GUTIERREZ, supra note 110, at 131. Japan's proposal regarding Article 3 liability
limits was not adopted, but did receive additional consideration later in negotiations. Id. at 130-31.
Norway included Japan's proposal as an alternative text in a draft submitted to the 81st Session of the
Legal Committee. Id. at 131. Japan also resubmitted its proposal at the 81st Session. Id. Although the
proposal was not adopted at that time, it is worth noting that there is some recognition amongst the
international community that current maritime liability systems can be unjust. See id. at 130-33.
139. Richard Boucher, Ratification of the 1999 Montreal Convention, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (Sept.
5, 2003), http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/2385 1.htm.
140. Athens Convention, supra note 108, art. 7(2).
141. Article 7(2) of the 2002 Athens Convention mandates:
A State Party may regulate by specific provisions of national law the limit of liability
prescribed in paragraph 1, provided that the national limit of liability, if any, is not lower
than that prescribed in paragraph 1. A State Party, which makes use of the option provided
for in this paragraph, shall inform the Secretary-General of the limit of liability adopted or of
the fact that there is none.
Id.
142. Id.
143. LLMC, supra note 101, art. 4.
144. Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30505 (2006). See also infra note 167.
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harmonized with the LLMC.145  Article 4 of the LLMC provides the relevant
provision defining the willful misconduct standard by which the limit can be
broken: "A person liable shall not be entitled to limit his liability if it is proved that
the loss resulted from his personal act or omission, committed with the intent to
cause such loss, or recklessly and with knowledge that such loss would probably
result."l 46
Article 13 of Athens contains similar language as the LLMC, providing that a
carrier may lose its right to the limit if "the damage resulted from an act or
omission of the carrier done with the intent to cause such damage, or recklessly
and with knowledge that such damage would probably result." 47 This is the same
as the defined "willful misconduct" standard required to break the limit under the
LLMC.148
Under the U.S. Limitation Act, a shipowner is not entitled to limitation where
causative fault occurred with the owner's "privity or knowledge." The MLA
considers the LLMC's defined "willful misconduct" standard as stricter than the
"privity or knowledge" standard required to break the limit in the United States.149
The LLMC therefore offers greater protection to shipowners with a higher standard
to break the limit, according to the MLA.iso The standard in the LLMC is
145. See Athens Convention, supra note 108, art. 13(1).
146. LLMC, supra note 101, art. 4 (emphasis added). The Comit6 Maritime International ("CMr'
or "Committee"), an international body responsible for drafting this provision, later explained that the
prior draft had to be changed since it could give rise to unlimited liability and varying court
interpretations. See COMITE MAR. INT'L, THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES OF THE LLMC CONVENTION,
1976 AND THE PROTOCOL OF 1996, at 121-22 (1997) [hereinafter TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES OF THE
LLMC CONVENTION]; DAMAR, supra note 103, at 166-67. The Committee then submitted its final
amended version to the IMO. DAMAR, supra note 103, at 166-67. The phrase included at the end, "or
recklessly and with knowledge that such loss would probably result" is meant to establish a "wilful
misconduct" standard. See TRAVAUX PRI PARATOIRES OF THE LLMC CONVENTION, supra note 146, at
122-24. CMI is an international non-governmental organization with the purpose of unifying all aspects
of maritime law. F. L. Wiswall, Jr., A Brief History, COMITE MAR. INT'L,
http://www.comitemaritime.org/A-Brief-History/0,27139,113932,00.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2014).
The CMI was established in 1897 with the purpose of compiling and codifying maritime law. Id.
During conference negotiations, the IMO sought to broaden the 1976 LLMC's strict willful
misconduct standard by adding the phrase "or from his own gross negligence" at the end of Article 4.
DAMAR, supra note 103, at 166-67 (regarding the CMI Committee's intent to define a "willful
misconduct" standard in Article 4 of the LLMC and the IMO's position during negotiations). The
French delegation also sought to add language ensuring that shipowners could not benefit from the limit
where an accident is caused by actions of servants acting within their scope of duties. Id. at 167. Neither
proposal had support in conference. Id. As a result, Article 4 was passed as proposed with the intent of
maintaining a limit that is almost unbreakable, except in the most rare, or even absurd, circumstances,
where the damage or injury was a direct result of an individual's "willful misconduct." See id. at 166-
70.
147. Athens Convention, supra note 108, art. 13(1).
148. MARTINEz GUTItRREZ, supra note 110, at 126.
149. MLA, REPORT, supra note 27, at 5.
150. Id.
Since the Convention has been adopted by most of the rest of the world's shipping nations,
the Committee majority questioned if it is economically viable and advisable to remove such
major claim components from limitation in the U.S., and to expose U.S. shipping to
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generally considered to allow breakability of limits only where the shipowner in
fact knew and intended the damage to occur.is5
The LLMC introduces a mens rea element into the standard to break liability
limits. Depending on implementation by national law and interpretation of courts,
the LLMC may protect owners whose operators indulge in negligent behavior
where the shipowner was not aware of such behavior. 152 For example, the limit
will not be broken in an action against a shipowner for damage caused by a
collision resulting from an operator's error in navigation.'53 The limit can only be
broken in an action against the shipowner where the shipowner is directly culpable
for damage. 15 4 In a suit against vessel crew as agents of the shipowner, the limit
will more than likely be upheld where the shipowner is only vicariously liable for
actions of his agents.'55 The liability limit may extend to a suit against an operator
also, where damage is a result of the operator's conduct. 56
A court must consider an inquiry into a shipowner's or any defendant's mens
rea on a case-by-case basis, under Article 4 of the LLMC.s 7 In addition, courts
would need to interpret the application of limits in actions against operators in
relation to the doctrine of respondeat superior, whereby an employer is liable for
the actions of its employees performed in furtherance of the employer's
business.15 On this issue, the LLMC appears to conflict with the doctrine of
respondeat superior, by attempting to shield a shipowner from unlimited liability
for damages caused by the willful misconduct of an operator. In contrast, U.S.
courts do break the limit against an owner for operator misconduct. 159
unlimited liabilities, putting U.S. shipping at a disadvantage in the international shipping
world. Excluding personal injury and death claims from the Limitation Act might also have
impacts in insurance markets, again with a competitive disadvantage in the potential for
added costs to U.S. vessel owners.
Id. at 4.
151. BARNABAS W.B. REYNOLDS & MICHAEL N. TsIMPLIS, SHIPOWNERS' LIMITATION OF
LIABILITY 75 (2012).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 27.
157. See id. at 83.
158. See DAMAR, supra note 103, at 196-97 (explaining that international maritime conventions
hold a servant or agent responsible for his own willful misconduct instead of placing liability on the
owner; hence, "there is no need to prove that the act or omission of the servant or agent was within the
scope of his employment").
159. U.S. Courts have broken liability limits for operator misconduct, where operators failed to
follow procedures established by shipowners. See XIA CHEN, LIMITATION OF LIABILITY FOR MARITIME
CLAIMS: A STUDY OF U.S. LAW, CHINESE LAW AND INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS 60-62 (2001). An
example, can be found in the Barberi incident of October 15, 2003. In re City of New York, 522 F.3d
279 (2d Cir. 2008). Here the court found that a collision occurred due to operator misconduct and that
the shipowner failed to adequately enforce operating procedures. Id. at 288.
On that afternoon, the Barberi collided with a maintenance pier during a routine run from New
York City to Staten Island, killing eleven and injuring seventy five from amongst 1,500 passengers. Id.
at 280-81. Standard operating procedure ("SOP") required the captain and assistant captain to be in the
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On the issue of mens rea, if unable to prove intent of an individual, the party
seeking to break the limit must prove recklessness, where recklessness is proof of
reckless conduct "with knowledge" that the loss "would probably result.""'o This
too is considered a much stricter standard than the U.S. "privity and knowledge"
standard. Under the LLMC, a claimant cannot break the limit by proving damage
was a possible outcome of conduct. 161  A claimant must prove a person had
knowledge that the damage was a probable outcome of conduct.162 "Knowledge"
as used in Article 4 of the LLMC means that the liable person had actual
knowledge, meaning the person actually knew damage would occur.163
"Knowledge" does not mean constructive knowledge, meaning that the person
should have known the damage would occur.' 6 In contrast, the U.S. approach
pilothouse for the duration of the voyage. Id. at 281. In the moments prior to the collision, the captain
was not in the pilothouse. Id. at 281. The Barberi was being steered by the assistant captain. See id. at
280-81. Unknown to the shipowner, the assistant was on a regimen of prescription medications
contributing to fatigue, compounded by babysitting his grandchildren the previous day. Id. at 281. The
ship collided with a maintenance pier at approximately 15 knots. See id. at 280-81.
In evaluating negligence, the court applied a common law "reasonable care" standard of
negligence (so interpreting the U.S. Limitation of Liability Act). See In re City of New York, 475 F.
Supp. 2d 235, 241 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). In breaking the liability limit, the court took note that the
shipowner neither disseminated nor enforced the SOP. Id. at 247-49. Thus, the shipowner's failure
constituted the type of "privity or knowledge" that warrants breaking the limit. Id. at 249-50. It
reasoned that "[t]his rule could have easily been complied with on the Barberi, because there were two
pilots on the vessel at all times. Instead, Captain Gansas spent the entire voyage in the aft, or
Manhattan-facing, pilothouse. Had he been present, the disaster would have been avoided." Id. at 238.
If the Limitation of Liability Act applied, the shipowner would have been able to limit claims to about
$14.4 million. Id. at 239. Instead, in 2008, New York City agreed to pay victims and their families
$54.3 million. Andy Newman, Judge Gives Man Paralyzed in Ferry Crash Highest Award So Far, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 17, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/18/nyregion/I8ferry.html.
Applying the "willful misconduct" standard of the LLMC to the event causing the Barberi
collision may well produce a different outcome. Failure to enforce an SOP does not constitute the mens
rea or actual knowledge element of willful misconduct that demonstrates the shipowner intended or
could know the outcome, in this case, a collision with a maintenance pier. U.S. courts commonly break
Limitation of Liability Act limits for violations of IMO ship standards, failure to detect defects,
improper stowage, etc. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text. These factors may well not be
available to break limits when applying the "willful misconduct" standard that would govern if the
LLMC were to be adopted into U.S. law.
160. LLMC, supra note 101, art. 4.
161. MARTiNEZ GUTItRREZ, supra note 110, at 65.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. The Leerort case provides an example of how unbreakable the limitation can be, at least in
the interpretation of the British Court of Appeal. DAMAR, supra note 103, at 168. The case involved the
collision of the vessel Zim Pireaus into the Leerort. Id. The Leerort was standing still in water at the
time of collision. Id. The Zim Pireaus on the other hand was racing towards the Leerort at excessive
speed. Id. The vessel was simply out of control. Id. The crew experienced an engine failure. Id. The
engine would shut off in the astern mode but function intermittently in an emergency mode. Id. The
court characterized the engine failure at a critical moment as "almost incredible" but found that it did
not justify breaking the limit. Id. The court asserted that the engine failure could not be attributed to a
"personal act or omission of the owners done with the intent to cause a collision or recklessly and with
knowledge that such a collision would probably occur." Id.
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allows a court to break the limit where the owner had privity or knowledge-as
earlier indicated, a vaguely defined phrase that allows flexible, albeit inconsistent
application, resulting in a lower threshold to break the limit than under the LLMC
or Athens.165 Although the MLA has indicated judicial economy is a benefit of
adopting the LLMC,' 66 this may not be the case. Requiring analysis of mens rea,
the LLMC may lead to complex and prolonged court proceedings.
Testifying before Congress in 1985, when Congress considered adopting the
LLMC's liability system through H.R. 277, Georgetown University Law Center
Professor Warren Dean explained that the standard to break the limit presents
claimants with an almost insurmountable hurdle to overcome in order to obtain
adequate compensation. 167 Moreover, unbreakable and low limits in the LLMC
may well provide a disincentive for owners to maintain safe and seaworthy vessels:
Even though this provision shifts the burden of proof from claimant to
the party wishing to limit liability, it will result in a nearly unbreakable
limit to liability. It is very difficult for claimants to establish that an
owner acted recklessly, knowing that loss would probably occur or
intending to cause the loss of the ship. This new, nearly unbreakable
limit is the trade-off for the bill's higher-but in our view inadequate-
liability limits.
Section 5 (of the bill adopting the LLMC) would replace the
current legal duty of the owner to provide a seaworthy ship before being
entitled to limit liability. The courts have been liberal in voiding
owners' attempts to limit liability by finding that an owner provided an
unseaworthy ship and the insurance market has been able to provide
insurance and to meet those costs. We are concerned that that
elimination of the owner's duty to provide a seaworthy ship could result
in unsafe shipping.68
With modem corporations, many layers of command and organizational
intricacies further complicate the relationship between a shipowner and his
employee. Inquiries into mens rea are complicated when analyzing "willful
misconduct" as defined in the LLMC. With the LLMC extending the limit to
persons other than the shipowner, the inquiry into mens rea is even further
complicated. The LLMC extends the limit to apply to actors other than the
shipowner, including charterers, managers, operators, salvors, and generally any
165. Donald C. Greenman, Limitation of Liability: A Critical Analysis of United States Law in an
International Setting, 57 TUL. L. REv. 1139, 1145-46 (1983) (noting that flexible interpretation leads
U.S. courts to refer to common law concepts in applying the standard and quoting Professors Gilmore
and Black describing U.S. statutory "privity or knowledge" and "design or neglect" as "empty
containers into which the courts are free to pour whatever content they will") (referencing GRANT
GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, Jr., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 695-97 (1957)). For a discussion about
U.S. courts' attempts to define the standard and difficulties in its application, see CHEN, supra note 159,
at 60-65.
166. MLA, REPORT, supra note 27, at 5.
167. Dean's Statement, supra note 81, at 9.
168. Id. at 8-9.
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person for whom an owner or salvor is responsible-a salvor being a person
providing salvage operations.169
Professor Dean cautioned Congress against extending application of the limit
by amending U.S. LOLA to adopt the LLMC:
We believe that, before such an expansion is made, there should be a
full evaluation of the question of liability limitation respecting modem
maritime activities-a process advanced by this hearing today. For
example, factors pertaining to the question of whether charterers or
managing operators should be allowed to limit their liability are
different from those pertaining to salvors, i.e., consideration should be
given to whether a salvor should not be entitled to limit liability, while
the owner of the vessel being salved is so entitled, as in the case of an
incident involving a response to an oil spill or release of hazardous
materials.170
Besides a clear and almost unbreakable limit, the MLA points to several other
advantages of adopting the LLMC into U.S. law.17 ' The LLMC would provide a
limitation fund even in cases where the vessel has no post-accident value,
preventing a zero compensation outcome.172 MLA further argues that the defined
"willful misconduct" standard focuses litigation away from establishing "privity or
knowledge" of the owner as required under LOLA. Instead, litigants can focus on
ordinary fault and valuation of damages.173 This also provides, so they say, for
better and more accessible insurance. MLA argues that without legal adjudication
for privity and fault in causality, vessel owners will be able to insure at least
against limit amounts.174 Moreover, this fund has a higher likelihood of actually
being paid to litigants. MLA also posits that the fund discourages formation of a
one-ship company to avoid liability.' LLMC also provides distinct funds for
personal injury and cargo liability, providing a clearer path to compensation.'7 ' In
addition, LLMC preserves the procedure of concursus that can be used to prevent a
rush to individual litigation and inequitable outcomes amongst multiple litigants.
MLA also sees benefits in adopting LLMC's reference to SDRs as opposed to
dollars, whose value fluctuates, based on international markets. 7 8
Although the LLMC would be an improvement over the arcane liability limits
established in LOLA, the benefits stated by MLA would appear to be inflated and
not to work to benefit the U.S. shipping industry much less passengers-simply
because the beneficiary of these limits would be foreign flagged cruise ships. This
169. LLMC, supra note 101, art. 1.
170. Dean's Statement, supra note 81, at 7.
171. See MLA, REPORT, supra note 27, at 5-7.
172. Id. at 5.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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is because cruise ships, designed to carry passengers, do not operate as U.S.
flagged vessels. As of September 2012, only one major cruise ship operated as a
U.S. flagged vessel, the Pride of America, a one-ship company operated by
Norwegian Cruise Lines.'7 9 Cruise vessels register abroad (the Bahamas is one
favorite registry) mostly to avoid labor laws and standards required of U.S. flagged
vessels.o8 0 Contrary to the MLA's list of benefits of adopting the LLMC,"' the
convention would only serve to protect and subsidize foreign flagged cruise
vessels by limiting their liability, at the expense of U.S. citizens or other
passengers able to file suit in the United States.
Other benefits stated by the MLA are also questionable. MLA's arguments,
such as that the LLMC would prevent litigation over "privity or knowledge" while
providing clear compensation funds,182 would seem to advance judicial economy,
but at the expense of fair compensation. MLA's position is ironic. It undermines a
fundamental purpose of courts, namely, to provide a fair resolution of disputes, and
instead promotes a policy that allegedly favors judicial economy and protection of
foreign flagged vessels. As noted above, the LLMC may not even provide
efficient resolution of disputes with complex inquiries into mens rea while
extending the limit to parties other than the shipowner. Such litigation is contrary
to MLA's position that the LLMC promotes "timely resolution of claims."
The basic purpose behind the LLMC and U.S. LOLA is the same. Both seek
to protect shipping lines.184 In discussing the United States' adoption of the LLMC
in 2010, the MLA stated, "[t]he majority of the Committee feels that this purpose
of providing the global economic competitiveness of America's maritime industry
remains a valid policy supporting the Limitation Act."' 8 5  Yet, the need to
encourage growth of a nascent industry that existed in 1851 no longer exists.
Moreover, there is hardly a U.S. flagged passenger line industry to protect. In
addition, the LLMC would introduce into U.S. law a far more stringent standard
for breaking liability limits.
Regarding unbreakability of limits, the issue caused enough concern in the
European Community to inspire a proposed directive in 2005 that would have
amended the standard to provide greater breakability.' 8 6  Although the final
amendments did not include modification of the defined "willful misconduct"
standard under the LLMC, the European Community has committed to negotiate
179. MARINE LOG, supra note 94.
180. James Walker, What Cruise Lines Don't Want You to Know, CNN (Feb. 14, 2013, 3:21 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/02/13/opinion/walker-cruise-ships (reporting on the recent incidents of cruise
ship mishaps).
181. MLA, REPORT, supra note 27, at 5-7.
182. Id. at 5.
183. Id. at 3.
184. See DAMAR, supra note 103, at 11-14 (discussing the historical development of maritime
liability limits as a way protecting the shipping industry).
185. MLA, REPORT, supra note 27, at 2.
186. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on the Civil Liability
and Financial Guarantees of Shipowners, COM (2005) 593 final (Nov. 23, 2005), available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2005:0593:FIN:EN:PDF.
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with the IMO to revise the "level at which shipowners lose their right to their
liability.""' When the international community shows concern about the defined
"willful misconduct" standard, this must be a signal to the U.S. Congress to
proceed with caution, if it all, towards adopting the LLMC, despite the MLA's
recommendation.
III. FORUM NON CONVENIENS
Any change to maritime death and injury liability limits is likely to have some
impact on the number of foreign plaintiffs bringing suit in the United States. Since
the adoption of the 1999 Montreal Convention by the United States in 2003, the
United States has seen a large increase in foreign plaintiffs suing in the United
States to take advantage of many features of U.S. law and a judicial system that
may result in far more generous recoveries for plaintiffs than what they would get
in their home courts.'8 On the one hand, this can lead to congestion in U.S.
courts. On the other, it provides international plaintiffs with access to remedies
and a judicial system that may not be available in their homes or elsewhere.
U.S. courts have found a method of dealing with the influx of foreign
plaintiffs by dismissing suit on the basis of forum non conveniens, forcing foreign
plaintiffs to re-file in their countries of domicile or permanent places of residence.
To demonstrate that dismissal for forum non conveniens is warranted, a defendant
must establish "that (1) an adequate alternative forum is available, (2) the public
and private factors weigh in favor of dismissal, and (3) the plaintiff can reinstate
his suit in the alternative forum without undue inconvenience or prejudice."l89
In Gulf Oil Corporation v. Gilbert, the U.S. Supreme Court described the
public and private interest factors that a court must consider when evaluating
potential dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds.' 90 In Gilbert, a warehouse
owner in Virginia filed suit in the Southern District of New York in diversity
against a corporation incorporated in Pennsylvania, but doing business in both
Virginia and New York.'9' The plaintiff brought action in tort against the
defendant for negligence in handling gasoline delivered to plaintiff's warehouse in
Virginia, causing an explosion which damaged the warehouse and goods stored
therein.192  Plaintiff sought damages in the amount of $365,529.77.193 On
defendant's forum non conveniens motion, the Court decided in favor of dismissal
187. Id. at 4.
188. See Allan I. Mendelsohn, Foreign Plaintiffs, Forum Non Conveniens, and the 1999 Montreal
Convention, 36 AiR & SPACE L. 293, 293 (2011) (discussing the influence of the U.S. contingency fee
system in attracting foreign plaintiffs after an international air incident and the increased use of forum
non conveniens by U.S. courts).
189. Leon v. Million Air, Inc., 251 F.3d 1305, 1311 (11th Cir. 2001).
190. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507-09 (1947).
191. Id. at 502-03.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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out of New York, concluding that Virginia was the appropriate alternative
forum.194
The Court also emphasized, however, that "unless the balance is strongly in
favor of the defendant, the plaintiffs choice of forum should rarely be
disturbed."l 95 Factors considered relating to the litigants' interests, termed private
interests, included: ease of access to sources of proof, ease of access to witnesses,
possibility of viewing premises, enforceability of the judgment once obtained, and
any other considerations "that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and
inexpensive."' 96 The Court also weighed factors it called public interest factors
such as congestion from existing case load and the burden on citizens of jury duty
especially where the litigation has no relation to the community.'9 7  The Court
explained, "[t]here is a local interest in having localized controversies decided at
home."' 9 8 Further, where state law applies to a diversity action, there is an interest
in maintaining a forum located in the state of the applicable law. 199 When a court
is satisfied that an alternative forum is available and the balance of public and
200private factors is in favor of the defendant, a court may dismiss the case.
Although Gilbert dealt with domestic litigants, the test outlined in Gilbert has
regularly been used also to dismiss foreign plaintiffs from U.S. courts on the
grounds of forum non conveniens. In applyingforum non conveniens, the Supreme
Court has also held that a plaintiffs choice of forum deserves less deference when
the plaintiff is foreign. 201 Forum non conveniens dismissals in the domestic U.S.
context are today handled under federal law, enacted in 1948.202
A recent example of the applicability of forum non conveniens is a ruling by
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida in Giglio Sub S.N. C. v.
Carnival Corporation, deciding a matter related to the wreck of the Costa
Concordia that occurred on January 13, 2012.203 The Costa Concordia, with 4,200
people aboard, hit a reef and sank off Italy's Tuscan coast on January 13, 2012,
204
causing the deaths of thirty-two passengers and over a hundred injuries. The
Southern District of Florida dismissed an action, on forum non conveniens
grounds, brought by Italian business owners and residents of the island of Giglio,
194. Id. at 511-12.
195. Id. at 508.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 508-09.
198. Id. at 509.
199. Id.
200. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981).
201. Id. at 256.
202. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2012).
203. Giglio Sub S.N.C. v. Carnival Corp., No. 12-21680-CIV, 2012 WL 4477504, at *1-2 (S.D.
Fla. Sept. 26, 2012).
204. Barbie Latza Nadeau & Laura Smith-Spark, S Convicted Over Deadly Costa Concordia
Cruise Liner Wreck in Italy, CNN (July 21, 2013, 9:16 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/20/world/europe/italy-costa-concordia-triallindex.html.
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Italy, alleging damage to tourism, property values, and the environment. 205 Other
actions are still pending in U.S. courts for personal injury and wrongful death.206
Applicability of forum non conveniens may occasionally be complicated by
blocking statutes, which are statutes passed in foreign jurisdictions to prevent
plaintiffs from re-filing in their home country after first filing in the United States
and being dismissed underforum non conveniens.207 Blocking statutes thus would
seem to prevent the availability of an alternative forum, thereby frustrating an
essential element of a U.S. court's forum non conveniens analysis. Blocking
statutes have been used in Latin American countries, with the Latin American
Parliament, Parlatino, issuing a model blocking statute for adoption by member
208countries. For many Latin American and other civil law countries, blocking
statutes do not create new law; rather they clarify existing jurisdictional
requirements as applied to a tort action first filed in the United States, to bar such
actions from being re-filed in the plaintiff s home country. Under the laws of these
countries, courts permanently lose jurisdiction once the case has been filed in an
alternative forum, in this case the United States. 209
This unique jurisdictional concept is rooted in the idea of deference to the
plaintiffs choice of forum. Once the plaintiff has chosen his forum amongst
viable alternatives, dismissal on the grounds offorum non conveniens is viewed by
Latin American countries as an illegal violation of the plaintiffs right to select an
appropriate forum.210 Moreover, the holding in Piper v. Reyno, that foreign
205. Giglio Sub S.N.C., 2012 WL 4477504, at *21.
206. See New York Law Firm Ronai & Ronai, LLP Files Wrongful Death Lawsuit Seeking 400
Million Dollars on Behalfof The Family of Violinist Sandor Feher Killed in the Concordia Disaster, PR
NEWSWIRE (Aug. 7, 2012), http://www.pmewswire.com/news-releases/new-york-law-firm-ronai--
ronai-llp-files-wrongful-death-lawsuit-seeking-400-million-dollars-on-behalf-of-the-family-of-violinist-
sandor-feher-killed-in-the-concordia-disaster-165267716.html (this particular suit has been filed in the
Southern District of New York (12CV-5814) on behalf of the family of Hungarian Violinist, Sandor
Feher, who died in the tragedy, seeking $400 million in damages).
207. See Allan 1. Mendelsohn & Carlos J. Ruiz, The United States vs. France: Article 33 of the
Montreal Convention and the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 77 J. AIR L. & COM. 467, 480-84
(2012) (discussing a recent and still current blocking problem in aviation under the 1999 Montreal
Convention).
208. MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND APPLICABLE LAW TO TORT LIABILITY
(Latin Am. Parliament (Parlatino) 1998), reprinted in HENRY SAINT DAHL, DAHL's LAW
DICTIONARY/DICCIONARIO JuRiDIcO DAHL: SPANISH-ENGLISHIINGLtS-ESPAROL 260-261 (5th ed.
2010).
209. See Henry Saint Dahl, Forum Non Conveniens, Latin America and Blocking Statutes, 35 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 21, 25-29 (2004) (discussing national laws of Ecuador, Guatemala,
Dominica, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica that divest jurisdiction when a national of these countries first
files suit in a foreign court, usually in the United States). See also Jena A. Sold, Comment,
Inappropriate Forum or Inappropriate Law? A Choice of Law Solution to the Jurisdictional Standoff
Between the United States and Latin America, 60 EMORY L.J. 1437, 1454-1457 (2011) (discussing
common law jurisdictional concepts in Latin American countries that bar jurisdiction once a case is
filed in a foreign court while also discussing Parlatino's model blocking statute and blocking statutes of
Ecuador and Guatemala).
210. SAINT DAHL, supra note 208, at, 26-27.
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plaintiffs deserve less deference in their choice of forum, is seen as unduly
discriminatory. 211
Another approach adopted by Latin American countries to discourage
defendants from seeking a forum non conveniens dismissal, is imported law
statutes. Such statutes attempt to apply the law of the courts where plaintiff
originally filed an action.212  Hence, a Latin American court hearing a case
dismissed from the United States would apply U.S. law. Such statues also increase
the chances of enforcement of a judgment against U.S. defendants. 213
The response of U.S. courts to blocking statutes has been increasingly to
ignore them.214 Courts reason that many blocking statutes contain potential
exceptions that may allow a plaintiff to re-file. However, even where forum non
conveniens is outcome determinative (leaving a plaintiff with no available forum),
U.S. courts have determined that its application of the forum non conveniens
doctrine must not and cannot be precluded or undermined by foreign blocking
statutes.215 Although the issue of foreign plaintiffs in U.S. courts must not be a key
consideration in maritime liability reform, it is an issue that Congress and/or the
courts may need to consider when revising liability limits and requirements.
211. Id. at 27-28.
212. Walter W. Heiser, Forum Non Conveniens and Retaliatory Legislation: The Impact on the
Available Alternative Forum Inquiry and on the Desirability ofForum Non Conveniens as a Defense
Tactic, 56 U. KAN. L. REv. 609, 628-34 (2008).
213. See id. at 660.
214. See Rivas ex rel. Estate of Gutierrez v. Ford Motor Co., No. 8:02 CV-676-T-17 EAJ, 2004
WL 1247018, at *4, *14 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 19, 2004) (the court rejected plaintiffs argument that a court
in Venezuela is not an available forum when applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens to a
wrongful death action against Ford Motor Company arising out of an accident in Venezuela); Morales
v. Ford Motor Co., 313 F. Supp. 2d 672, 674-76, 689-90 (S.D. Tex. 2004) (the court ruled that plaintiffs
who were Venezuelan nationals who had filed an action in the Southern District of Texas, could assert
jurisdiction in Venezuelan courts, despite affidavits from experts explaining that plaintiffs' assertions of
jurisdiction in a U.S. court divests jurisdiction in Venezuelan courts when filing in Venezuela after a
forum non conveniens decision in the United States). See also Sold, supra note 209, at 1460-61
(discussing both Rivas and Morales).
215. See Scotts Co. v. Hacienda Loma Linda, 2 So. 3d 1013, 1017-18 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist.
2008):
Expressed another way, if our courts determine that a foreign forum is available and
adequate, it is the obligation of the plaintiff to assent to jurisdiction there and to support that
court's exercise ofjurisdiction over the matter and the parties. Further, that plaintiff may not
assume that a foreign country's preemption or blocking laws will be recognized here. If the
foreign country chooses to turn away its own citizen's lawsuit for damages suffered in that
very country, and if the other Kinney factors warrant dismissal here, it is difficult to
understand why Florida's courts should devote resources to the matter.
Id. at 1018. See also Chandler v. Multidata Systems Int'l Corp., 163 S.W.3d 537, 546-48 (Mo. Ct. App.
2005) ("As to Plaintiffs' argument that Panama is not an available forum, Plaintiffs merely recite
favorable testimony from Dr. Berrios and argue that 'the trial court had a legal obligation to conclude
that the Panamanian court system was not available to these Plaintiffs.' As stated above, the trial court
did not have a legal obligation to conclude that the Panamanian court system was unavailable.").
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IV. THE MARITIME INSURANCE INDUSTRY'S CAPACITY TO HANDLE CLAIMS
The maritime insurance industry has generally argued against removal of
liability limits, claiming that vessels may be subject to claims that are uninsurable
due to excessive verdicts. 216  Maritime insurance is protection and indemnity
("P&I") insurance provided by P&I Clubs. The nature of this coverage is as
typical indemnity insurance, where an insurer is responsible to reimburse a
shipowner only for losses the shipowner paid. This varies from liability insurance
where the insured pays a set amount so the insurer will handle claims without
further payment from the insured.
P&I insurance present problems in collecting judgments for injured parties. A
P&I Club cannot be held directly accountable to pay a verdict. 217 The insured
shipowner must first pay.218 Only then will the P&I Club pay the insured. Where
a verdict leads a shipowner to file for bankruptcy, an injured party with a judgment
may not collect.2 19  The P&I Club is not obligated to pay damages filed by a
220judgment creditor in a bankruptcy proceeding against a shipowner.
The judgment creditor is generally barred from filing an action directly
against a P&I Club.221 Some states have modified this general rule, allowing third
party claims against a P&I Club, although third party actions raise additional
complications.222 When third party actions are allowed by state law, the P&I Club
is entitled to raise any defenses it has against the insured.223  The insured must
meet all terms and conditions in the policy before the P&I Club will pay a
judgment creditor.224 Policies typically include an arbitration clause.225 Courts
have held that a third party judgment creditor is subject to a policy's arbitration
clause.226
216. Professor Mendelsohn considered the shipping industry's position while advocating for reform
of liability limits in the aftermath of the Yarmouth Castle's drowning in 1965. Mendelsohn, supra note
47, at 803-05. Professor Mendelsohn notes the following arguments made by industry in arguing
against repeal of liability limits: (1) limitations on maritime claims is the international norm; (2)
unlimited liability would be the financial ruin of vessel owners and the U.S. shipping industry; and, (3)
a limited compensation promotes judicial economy by consolidating all actions through the procedure
of concursus. Id. The MLA has adopted these same arguments in its position paper advocating for
adoption of the LLMC. See MLA, REPORT, supra note 27, at 2-4.
217. Kimball, supra note 23, at 1149-50.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1153.
220. See Aasma v. Am. S.S. Owners Mut. Prot. & Indem. Ass'n, 95 F.3d 400, 404-05 (6th Cir.
1996) ("The narrow question presented is whether, five years after the close of the bankruptcy of a
member, a maritime protection and indemnity association with a 'pay first' clause in its contract is
liable to seamen in direct actions. We conclude that the 'pay first' clause in this contract may not be set
aside and that it defeats plaintiffs' cause of action.").
221. See id.
222. Kimball, supra note 23, at 1153-55.
223. Id. at 1154 (referencing Morewitz v. W. of Eng. Ship Owners Mut. Prot. & Indem. Ass'n, 62
F.3d 1356, 1364 (1995)).
224. Id. at 1156-57.
225. Id. at 1152-53.
226. Id. at 1150-51.
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According to the maritime insurance industry, liability limits are necessary to
avoid these complications.227 Maritime insurers argue that limitation of liability
assures that claims will be paid, whereas unlimited liability may lead to excessive
verdicts that may not be paid by their P&I Clubs, driving shipowners to
bankruptcy.228 Rather than maintaining liability limits, the maritime industry could
shift away from P&I insurance to liability insurance. Using liability insurance, the
insured shipowner would be subject to a premium for insurance coverage in the
amount that the market will bear with the insurer handling claims.
The airline industry made arguments against eliminating liability limits,
similar to arguments of the maritime industry,229 prior to the signing of the IATA
Intercarrier Agreement in November 1996 that waived all liability limits of the
Warsaw Convention.230 The industry argued that unlimited liability would
bankrupt airlines due to uninsurable claims-a situation that neither benefits
injured claimants nor the airline industry. 231 Today, almost 20 years later, the
airline industry is not unduly burdened by removing the arcane limits provided in
the 1929 Warsaw Convention, and its progeny. Around 1996, most developed
countries accepted the proposition that the policy of protecting and subsidizing the
airline industry by way of limiting its liability to passengers was no longer relevant
or necessary.232 There can be no question that the same conditions exist in the
maritime industry today.
Moreover, with a highly developed airline insurance industry already
functioning well and efficiently without any liability limitations, there is every
likelihood that air insurers can fill the void if and when maritime P&I Clubs are
unable to provide adequate insurance when liability limits are lifted. In testimony
before a Congressional subcommittee in 1985, Professor Dean commented on the
capacity of the air insurance industry:
Considering that liability in other modes of domestic
transportation is unlimited-and that these modes of passenger
carriage are able to cover their unlimited risks by conventional
insurance-we seriously question the continuing validity of the
limitation of liability concept to passenger carriage. Air carriers
routinely cover passenger liability for aircraft carrying 400
passengers. Their insurance cost is [low]. We make this
recommendation fully recognizing that the market structure for
maritime insurance may differ from other transportation
insurance and that insurance capacity is not unlimited. However,
we have no indication that insurance coverage will be
227. See generally Mendelsohn, supra note 47, at 803-05.
228. Kimball, supra note 23, at 1149-50.
229. See Reed v. Wiser, Jr., 555 F.2d 1079, 1089 (2d Cir. 1977).
230. Doo Hwan Kim, The Innovation of the Warsaw System and the IATA Intercarrier Agreement,
in THE UTILIZATION OF THE WORLD'S AIR SPACE AND FREE OUTER SPACE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 65,
68-70 (Chia-Jui Cheng & Doo Hwan Kim eds., 2000).
231. See Reed, 555 F.2d at 1089.
232. Doo Hwan Kim, supra note 230, at 68, 70-72.
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unavailable. Moreover our recommendation [to repeal liability
limits for personal injury] increases shipowners' incentives to
avoid loss. 233
It is difficult to imagine that the existence of maritime P&I Clubs would
somehow be endangered if the United States were to repeal its maritime liability
limits. First, the current arcane U.S. limit is frequently broken, rendering no
liability limit under the current law. 234 Hence, lifting the liability limit altogether is
unlikely to cause a flurry of excessive claims. Second, current P&I Clubs have the
capacity to insure in excess of their general policy limit of $30 million through a
special contract with Lloyds of London as the underwriter.235 Third, if and when a
profusion of foreign plaintiffs begin to seek remedies in U.S. courts, the maritime
industry can employ the same forum non conveniens defenses as the aviation
industry is employing so effectively today.
V. CONCLUSION
The Limitation of Liability Act of 1851 was passed to protect and encourage a
nascent shipping industry. The act was a reaction to New Jersey Steam v.
Merchant's Bank, a case in which liability against a shipowner was seen as a
windfall. U.S. shipowners of the 1800's were in direct competition with British
vessels that had the advantage of liability limitation protections. Congress and the
Supreme Court in 1851, and the years thereafter, determined that U.S. shipowners
must have strong protections to develop maritime transport and encourage
commerce. In the late 1800s, limits not only served an economic purpose, but also
advanced the cause of equity by relieving shipowners from liability where they
were not responsible for an accident simply because they often had no control of
vessels operating at sea thousands of miles away. Today, shipowners are complex
corporations often exerting control over all aspects of operations, made possible by
modem technology.
Having inherited protections to U.S. shipowners from the 1851 Limitation of
Liability Act, U.S. maritime liability limits today only serve to protect owners of
foreign flagged cruise vessels. Only one cruise vessel today operates as a U.S.
flagged vessel, benefiting from the limit. The limit thus places U.S. citizens under
a threat of being undercompensated for loss of life or injuries occurring aboard
foreign-flagged passenger vessels.
To be sure, the MLA has adopted a contrary view. As recently as 2010, the
MLA stated, "[t]he majority of the Committee [MLA] feels that this purpose of
providing the global economic competitiveness of America's maritime industry
remains a valid policy supporting the Limitation Act." 236 However, this is an
overly simplified position that not only fails to recognize that there is only one
233. Dean's Statement, supra note 81, at 6-7.
234. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
235. Patrick J. Bonner, Marine Insurance Considerations, FREEHILL, HOGAN & MAHAR LLP,
http://www.freehill.com/articles/marineinsurance.cfm (last visited Jan. 23, 2014).
236. MLA, REPORT, supra note 27, at 2.
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U.S. flagged passenger vessel in existence today, but also fails to consider the
sophistication of modem shipping and their corporate owners. These corporations
and their owners reap benefits from registering their vessels outside the United
States, avoiding U.S. labor standards and taxes that apply to U.S. flagged vessels-
all the while benefiting from U.S. liability limits at the expense of U.S. citizen-
claimants.
Congress has considered the issue from time to time but has consistently
failed to repeal the limit, despite strong support from the State Department and
most Executive agencies in 1966, during congressional hearings after the
Yarmouth Castle sank. Congress passed the current limit as in interim measure in
1984, establishing a fund of $420 times the weight of the vessel, intending to pass
permanent reforms at a later time.237 Now, nearly 30 years later, Congress has not
reformed the law. This failure could produce inequitable outcomes, as Congress
noted in 2010 when Transocean attempted to use the Limitation of Liability Act to
limit its liability for personal injuries after the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in April
2010.238 Hearings on the issue from 1966, 1984, and 1985 indicate that Congress
seems to have been overwhelmed by industry witnesses, representing and lobbying
for shipowners' interests. 239 But their arguments have no relevance in 2013, when
shipowners have the benefit of protections in modem corporate law, and corporate
shipowners exert control over all aspects of ship operation, a control that
shipowners of the 1850's did not have the technology to exert.
Congress must undertake a detailed inquiry into the capacity of the marine
insurance industry to handle maritime claims without the subsidy of current
limits. 240 Such an inquiry is more than likely to reveal the resilient capacity of the
industry to handle claims without a statutory limit-as is currently the case in all
237. REP. WALTER BEAMAN JONES SR., MARITIME SAFETY ACT OF 1983, H.R. REP. No. 98-525, at
10-11 (1983).
238. REP. JOHN CONYERS JR., CHAIRMAN, SECURING PROTECTIONS FOR THE INJURED FROM
LIMITATIONS ON LIABILITY ACT, H.R. REP. 111-521, at 11 (2010).
239. See Mendelsohn, supra note 47, at 802-05 (describing the industry arguments in the 1966
hearings); see also H.R. REP. No. 98-525, at 10-11; H.R. 277, 99th Cong. § 5 (1985); H.R. 3156, 99th
Cong. (1985).
240. Mendelsohn, supra note 47, at 805. Professor Mendelsohn articulated areas for congressional
inquiry in a paper published in 1969, analyzing options to reform LOLA in light of the Yarmouth Castle
incident in 1965. Id. These recommendations are still relevant today as they deal with the maritime
insurance industry's capacity to handle claims and include:
(1) what capacity the insurance market can withstand today; (2) to what extent or how this
capacity can be expanded in the face of the most urgent circumstances; (3) what would be
the incremental insurance cost to American flag owners if limits were repealed altogether or
if they were increased very substantially; (4) what would be the percentage increase in the
owner's gross operating expenses resulting from these incremental costs; and, finally, (5) if
the costs to the owner are, as they well may be, too high, is the government prepared to
increase direct public subsidies rather than continuing the present system of indirect private
subsidies through the means of depressing the recoveries of the victims and survivors of
disasters.
Id.
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modes of U.S. transport including air, rail, and road. 241 The Montreal Convention
of 1999 also provides unlimited liability for death and injury claims in
242international air transportation.
The MLA supports adoption of the 1996 LLMC. 243 Both the 1996 LLMC and
the 2002 Athens Convention would increase the limit over the current one in U.S.
LOLA. But adoption of international conventions could potentially implement a
stricter standard for the breakability of limits, depending on U.S. courts'
interpretation. As written, both international conventions implement a "willful
misconduct" standard, as defined therein, that the drafters intended as almost
unbreakable. 244 Although both conventions provide higher compensation funds,
the adequacy of compensation would vary based on the number of passengers
making claims against a fund. Compensation could be inadequate, especially
applying the LLMC, which has the lower limit of the two. 245
The 2002 Athens Convention would at least provide the United States with an
option to opt out of all liability limits, through the opt-out clause in Article 7(2) of
the Convention, while enjoying the benefit of being part of an international
regime.246 Opting out of the liability limits may also provide an incentive at the
global level for other countries to do the same. Europe has indicated an interest in
negotiating with the IMO to repeal all maritime liability limits, making
international maritime law in this respect identical to international air law.
In the U.S. system of tort compensation, damages in personal injury and
wrongful death actions can be estimated by seemingly mystical actuarial data that
attempt to approximate intangibles such as life expectancy. An expert opinion is
needed to estimate earning potential, degree of dependence of survivors, and other
factors. Although the U.S. system of compensation is not perfect, U.S. courts
nonetheless manage to evaluate monetary compensation for injuries, and even the
incompensateable loss of life, to provide compensation that would be more just
than those that result from shipowners' liability limits. Congress should not wait
for the next maritime disaster to consider repeal of the "interim" liability limits it
set in 1984 in the now antiquated U.S. Limitation of Liability Act.
241. S. 3251, 89th Cong. §1(b) (1966), H.R. 10327, 89th Cong. (1966) & S. REP. No. 89-1483, at
10-20 (1966) (report of the Committee on Commerce about the bills at issue, stating endorsement of
agencies).
242. Montreal Convention, supra note 125, art. 21(2).
243. MLA, REPORT, supra note 27, at 7.
244. MARTINEZ GUTiERREZ, supra note 110, at 126.
245. Compare Protocol to LLMC, supra note 115, art. 4 (USD $268,752 multiplied by the number
of passengers the ship is authorized to carry), with Athens Convention, supra note 108, art. 7(1)
($614,290 multiplied by the number of passengers the ship is authorized to carry).
246. Athens Convention, supra note 108, art. 7(2).
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